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Abstract 
Since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in early 1990s, governments in Africa have established 
measures and mechanisms to institutionalise and consolidate democracy. International community and local non-
governmental organizations have been at the forefront in supporting democratisation initiatives by governments. 
Despite the efforts, there are structural factors that impede institutionalisation and consolidation of democracy. 
This paper therefore, seeks to offer a critical analysis of the factors that are contributing to the erosion of 
democracy. Country examples are highlighted to support the thesis of the paper. The paper uses historical 
trajectory to demonstrate how patronage, ethnicity, electoral authoritarianism and extension of presidential term 
limit erodes democratic gains in Africa. The paper concludes that in order for democracy to flourish in African, 
structural impediments to democracy need to be addressed.     
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1. Introduction 
The concept democracy has been part of man’s political life for ages. Indeed, the concept has percolated from the 
ancient Greek to modern day nation-state. In defining democracy, scholars have identified similar central tenets 
inseparable to democracy. A definition by Schumpeter in 1947, later refined by Dahl in 1971 emphasizes free, 
fair, periodic and competitive elections with widespread participation which culminate into lawfully contested 
political systems. Schumpeter's classical definition of democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” is in tandem with Dahl's concept of 'polyarchy' which encompasses elected officials, free and fair 
elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information and 
associational autonomy (Chandler, 1999: 7).  
Mukandala (2001:4) introduces the social, economic and political dimensions of democracy. According 
to him, democracy entails the social networks of production, state and state power and accompanying institutions 
and existing frameworks of social organisation or what he calls “mode of social organisation of society.” It is 
apparent from the foregoing that democracy permeates every facet of human life. It defines and gives meaning to 
the life of the “political animal” it defines the trajectory of a polity. It goes beyond holding elections and 
establishing institutions.  Gunther (cited in Chandler, 1999: 7) agrees to this by asserting that “merely creating 
democratic institutions and holding elections captures only part of the process through which stable, viable 
democratic systems come into being”.  
For democracy to survive, Bratton and Mattes (2007: 193) submit that large majorities of citizens 
should demand democracy as their preferred political regime and judge that their leaders have internalized and 
follow democracy's institutional rules. Dahl, further revealed that “the prospects for stable democracy are 
improved if its citizens and leaders strongly support democratic ideals, values, and practices. The most reliable 
support comes when these beliefs and predispositions are imbedded in the country’s culture and are transmitted, 
in large part, from one generation to the next” Ringen (2009: 229). Mukandala (2001:2) succinctly summarizes 
the standard that can be used to interrogate transition and consolidation of democracy. He highlights (1) holding 
successive elections (2) peaceful alternation in power of political parties/leaders (3) longevity of regime and (4) 
respect of democratic governments by other players. Monty G. Marshall (2014:14) yardstick includes (1) 
competitiveness of political participation (2) openness and competiveness of executive recruitment and (3) 
constrains of the chief executive. The yardsticks provided by the two scholars are appropriate in understanding 
democracy in Africa. The two frameworks can be used in different dosage to analyse Africa’s democratic 
trajectory.   
Since the second wave of democratisation that engulfed most part of the continent in the 1990s, 
governments in Africa have attempted to institutionalise and consolidate the tenets of democracy. Multiparty 
elections have been introduced and constitutions redrafted. Certainly, gains have been made to entrench 
democratic principles in most post-independence African states. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997), Chege (1992) and 
Mukandala (2001) are optimistic on the future of democracy in the continent. To them, democracy continues to 
disconnect Africa states from the “dark” past, a past that was characterized by authoritarianism, political 
assassinations, military coups and subjugation of individual rights. They view democracy as a timely ideology 
that offers a footstool for reforms, strong institution and guarantees civil liberties.  
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Despite the trumpeted progress, questions have been raised on the commitment of African leaders in 
propagating ideals of democracy. Venter (2003: 1-2) is poignant in his description of the situation, he writes that 
“the most common perception is that of a democratic government under siege, of constitutional governance 
being undermined, of the rule of law being flagrantly disregarded.” Indeed, Venter (2003) summarizes the 
predicament of Africa’s democratic quest.  The question at this point, therefore, is why is the democracy project 
not working two decades after the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Africa? This paper delves into this 
question in-depth. The appraisal limits its self to the period 1992-2015. This period has been selected premised 
on the fact that this is the period that African governments have been grappling with entrenching democracy. 
Both secondary and primary data is used to buttress the argument. Primary data was adduced from key 
informants who have been involved both academically and in practice with Africa democratisation process. The 
paper is organised in three thematic parts. Part one discusses existing democratic theories, part two looks at 
Africa’s democratic trajectory and the final part delves on the structural factors that have contributed to the 
erosion of democracy in Africa.  
 
2. Theories of Democracy  
The literature on democracy theorising has oscillated between modernisation, structuralism, transitional and 
cultural theories. In the four clusters, different factors have been attributed to have given impetus to the 
emergence of democracy in different polities. The modernisation school of thought attributes the emergence of 
democracy to economic development.  To the proponents (Lipset, 1959; Rostow, 1960, Almond and Verba, 1963 
and Moore, 1966) of this theory, democracy and economic development are twin concepts that coexist side by 
side. The progenitors of modernisation posit that polities can only embrace democracy if they attain some degree 
of economic development.  Thus, if a polity seeks to be a democracy, it must modernise. Lipset (1959) cogently 
writes that modernisation provides a fertile ground for the seeds of democracy to germinate. It triggers 
“widespread education, a large middle class, an independent civil society, and liberal democratic values” (Lipset, 
1959:78).  
While this narrative can be conceived as true in reference to some countries in Europe and America to 
be specific, it cannot be entirely generalized to represent the reality in other polities in different geographical 
space. Comparative political literature is awash with countries that have attained higher degree of economic 
development without embracing libertarian principles. As noted by a respondent who spoke to us “China is not a 
democracy but it has attained the Millennium Development Goals (notably it has been particularly successful in 
reducing the share of extreme poverty). This has translated into great economic dividends for the global 
economy1.” The Asian tigers are another example of unprecedented success of prioritising development over 
democracy. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan make up this group of countries. Diamond, 
(2013:6) is exquisite in his analysis. He submits that  “Rulers such as Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan (r. 1950–75), 
Park Chung Hee in South Korea (r. 1961–79), and Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore (r. 1959–90) were able to 
develop their countries with Lee promoting “Asian Values” of order, family, authority, and community.” Their 
“undemocratic” nature has not prevented them from “attracting high levels of external aid, substantial foreign 
investment, and economic partnerships with other countries” (Joseph, 2014: 64).  
In Africa, the influence of development over democracy can be seen in Ethiopia and Rwanda. The two 
countries have been cited to circumvent some tenets of democracy by human rights groups. The two countries 
have been labeled to be practicing “developmental patrimonialism”. Joseph, (2014:63) notes that these two 
countries draw inspiration from the East Asian economies as they make economic policy with the long term 
agenda in mind and, like the East Asian models, they seek to promote agricultural and industrial initiatives that 
take advantage of niche opportunities in the global economy. Their governance structures are also different. 
Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame often described as austere and the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia was considered a social revolutionary. Thus irrespective of their governance styles they are similar in 
that they “promote developmental governance conceived as optimising the performance of public and private 
institutions” (Joseph, 2014: 64). We argue in this paper that the perceived ability of President Paul Kagame to 
deliver economic benefits to his citizens is the antithesis of allowing him to overstay his welcome in power – 
third term. Certainly not withstanding its checkered democratic record, Rwanda under the stewardship of 
Kagame has performed exceptionally well economically. According to African Economic Outlook 2015, 
Rwanda’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 4.7 percent in 2013 to 7.0 percent in 2014. It is 
projected to rise to 7.5 percent in 2015 – 2016. The above cited examples negate the popular assumption being 
propounded by modernist that there is a nexus between democracy and economic development.   
On the other hand, there are countries that have embraced democracy without achieving economic 
development. Rakner (2007:8) observes that “a large number of countries experiencing a transition to democracy 
during the third wave fell in the bottom third of the Human Development Index.” Most countries in sub-Sahara 
                                                          
1 Key informant interview conducted on 3rd November 2015 
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Africa fall within the purview of this argument. Thus the modernisation assumption becomes a fallacious 
argument in understanding the emergence of democracy. From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that 
modernisation theory has some glaring gaps and it cannot account for realities as far as democracy and economic 
development are concerned.  
The second theory of democratisation is structuralism. The crux of this theory is premised on its 
inclination to social class. The proponents (Moore 1966; Grugel 2002) of this theory underscore the centrality of 
social classes in propagating the emergence of democracy. Moore (1966) identifies three interclass relationships 
that give impetus to democracy: the peasant, land owners and the bourgeoisie. The antagonistic relationship 
between the classes triggers the birth of a democratic society.  A cursory look at Africa, one is persuaded to 
argue that the African peasant was a force in the democratic emancipation during the independence era. African 
peasants formed liberation movements to fight for independence and the installation of democratic order. In 
Kenya for example, the Mau Mau largely composed of petty peasants was instrumental in the independence 
struggle. The same can be said of South Africa during the apartheid regime. Samyurira (1978:8) citing the South 
Africa experience opines that:  
the Soweto and Langa uprising in June 1976 were only the visible tip of a fully-fledged [class] 
struggle between the white bourgeoisie and the black working class in South Africa….The 
young students who burned down their schools and the workers who refused to go to work 
represent advanced elements of a proletarian class that has been developing in South Africa for 
many years.   
During multiparty era, the middle class (which was mainly composed of lawyers, intelligentsia, 
politicians, urban workers and clerks in Marxist term petty bourgeoisie) was instrumental in the agitation for 
multipartism in various countries in Africa in the 1990s. It is, therefore, not farfetched to argue that the class 
struggles was and is still is important in the democratisation of the African continent. Despite the utility of 
structuralism in understanding the emergence of democracy, it has been criticized for over emphasising on the 
social classes thus overlooking other important aspects such as the role of institutions (churches, civil society 
organizations, and media) in the emergence of democracy. In addition it does take into cognizance of the role of 
external factors in triggering the proliferation of democracies. As we will later discuss in this paper, the 
international community and the Bretton Woods Institutions played a key role in the reintroduction of pluralism 
in Africa.  
Other theories that have been used to explain the emergence of democracy and are relevant in 
explaining Africa’s democratic trajectory are the agency or process-oriented approach and the cultural approach. 
The process-oriented approach emphasizes on the role of actors interaction in the emergence of democracy. The 
approach further takes cognizance of prevailing electoral systems, constitutional frameworks, institutions and 
international dynamics in propagating democracy. On the other hand, the cultural approach accentuates on 
cultural and religious factors and historical antecedents such as military or authoritarian rule in contributing in 
the emergence of democracy. It is apposite to mention that the structural and the process-oriented approach have 
been used to propound the discourse on Africa democratisation (See for example Huntington 1991 and Bratton 
and van de Walle 1994). After discussing the theoretical underpinnings of democracy, it’s incumbent upon this 
paper to delve into Africa’s experience with democracy which we now turn to.   
 
3. Historiography of Democracy in Africa 
The historiography of democracy in Africa can be dissected into three phases – the pre-independence, the post-
independence 1960-1990 and the post multiparty phase (1990- to current). Two questions abound at this point.  
Did pre-independence African society practice some form of democracy? If yes, how was it practiced? Afro-
centric scholars (Rodney, 1972; Green, 1964; Ezeanyika, 2011) have authoritatively held the view that before the 
advent of colonialism, African societies practiced some form of “African democracy” that was hitched on 
egalitarianism.  There were institutions that were responsible to make decisions on behalf of the large 
community – in Rousseau’s words the commonwealth. In some communities the decisions were made by elders 
who sat under a tree through participatory consensus. Citing an example of the Igbo society of Eastern Nigeria, 
Ezeanyika (2011) lucidly argues that the Igbos had an elaborate political system that bequeathed responsibility to 
elders to make, execute and adjudicate decisions. According to him, the Igbos indigenous government was 
decentralized and segmented. Ezeanyika (2011) writes that: 
The Igbos governed themselves through a communalist political system that was largely 
referred to as democratic, republican or segmentary. The system was considered democratic 
because it allowed each married adult member of the house hold, kindred, village, clan to 
participate in debates, express his or her views and vote. It was republican because it embodied 
a corresponding set of democratic, meritocratic and egalitarian values and political culture. It 
was segmentary because it was actualized through various segments from the house hold to the 
clan level.      
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In Kenya, the council of Jodongo among the Luo community played a cardinal role in ensconcing 
democratic values. They made decisions on the affairs of the community. They held the community together and 
ensured that the system was cohesive enough for posterity.  Everybody was allowed to input into the discussions 
before a decision was made. The Age-set system also characterized pre-colonial democratic system. According 
to Bradley (2005:415), the “Age-set system provided a more systematic organisation of the social, political and 
economic affairs of the particular nation.” The Age-set system symbolized societal continuity and prepared 
individuals for leadership. In summary we argue that the pre-colonial African society practiced what we refer to 
a “hybrid democracy” that was characterized by:  
1. Communal approach to social affairs. The interest of the community superseded individual interest. 
2. Largely egalitarian  
3. Decisions were made through consensus.  
4. Chieftaincy and council of elders were highly revered they made and executed decisions and 
adjudicated on the affairs of the community. The decisions made were in consonant with the general 
good. 
Despite the glamorous picture being painted above on the pre-colonial African “hybrid democracy,” it 
was not devoid of blemish. The pre-colonial democratic system has been accused of being discriminatory. 
Women were not allowed to participate in most community decisions. In fact in some communities women were 
considered as men’s property or categorized as “children”. Therefore, by discriminating against women, the 
system negated the democratic principles of popular representation and participation.  A number of pre-colonial 
chiefdoms were also totalitarian in nature.  Ezeanyika (2011: 10) mentions the emperors of Ethiopia, the 
Kabakas of Uganda and Shaka Zulu of South Africa as notable examples. The leaders of these chiefdoms ruled 
with an iron hand and opposition to their rule was scorned at. The leaders abhorred any opposition. Despite the 
pitfalls, it is incumbent upon Africa scholars to appreciate the democratic culture that permeated the various 
facets of pre-colonial African society. However rudimentary, some typology of democracy was practiced as 
elucidated above.  
The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 that culminated in the scramble and partition of Africa led to the 
dismantling of the traditional African democracy.  It ushered the colonial rule.  The colonial rule was mainly 
geared towards exploitation and accumulation – what we call giving life to imperialism.  Osha (2014:34) argues 
that “the colonial [rule] emasculated and bastardized the indigenous political institutions.” The colonial rule 
introduced new values, religion, education system, new mode and means of production and above all new system 
of governance much to the chagrin of the natives. In the Democratic Republic of Congo for example, King 
Leopold established administrative apparatus that were used for control.  Leopold used mixed system for 
economic exploitation, enacted taxation laws to compel the natives to pay taxes and crafted policies that 
guaranteed resource accumulation (Kisangani, 2012: 12-13).  The same scenario was replicated in Nigeria and 
Kenya under the British rule and Mozambique under the Portuguese rule.     
With the lethargic colonial rule becoming unbearable, nationalist movements emerged under the 
leadership of African elites to defeat the already entrenched colonial hegemony. By late 1960s most Africa 
colonies had attained independence. New systems of governments were introduced and new constitutions 
enacted. It suffices to mention that post-independence constitutions advocated for democratic values – rule of 
law, separation of power, civil and political rights, political participation and periodic elections. However, the 
gains of independence were immediately reversed. Authoritarian rule was soon established, constitutions 
amended, monolithic political parties established and presidents for life installed (Gentili, 2005:4).  In Malawi 
for example, Mpesi and Svåsand, (2012: 2) allude to the fact that Hastings Kamuzu Banda engineered a 
constitutional change that made Malawi a de jure one party state. Politics was highly personalized and dissenting 
views were not tolerated (Otele and Etyang 2015:30).  From the foregoing it is apparent that democracy had been 
severely challenged.  Ham and Lindberg, (2015: 522) poignantly note that by the end of the 1980s “42 out of 47 
regimes in Africa were either closed autocracies or socialist regimes holding non-competitive, single party 
elections.” The consequences of the closed political system were the many coups that were recorded between 
1960 – 1990. Goldsmith (2001) observes that out of 180 leadership changes that occurred between 1960 and 
1999, 101 occurred through coup d’états or uncouth means. Osha (2014:34) on the other hand submits that by 
the dawn of 1985, 23 coups had been recorded in Africa.  
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Table 1:1 Trends in the Nature of Governance and Multiparty Democracies in Africa. 
Political 
State 
Not yet 
independent 
Leader at 
Independence 
Coup d'etat Other 
transitions 
Single-party 
elections 
Multi-party 
Elections 
1975 11 5 12 10 12 3 
1985 3 3 11 12 18 7 
1995 1 1 6 12 4 30 
2005 1 1 3 14 1 34 
2015 0 2 0 3 1 43 
Source: Brookings Institute of African Leadership, 2015 
The oppressive neopatrimonial rule that characterized most post-independence regimes in Africa, 
economic meltdown of 1980s coupled with the third wave of democratisation that swept through Spain and 
Portugal and unrelenting pressure from Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank) and internal pressure from civil society organizations, churches, media forced many Africa governments 
to reintroduce multiparty pluralism (Huntington, 1991, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, Brown, 2001). 
Elections have been held, new constitutions enacted and democratic institutions established.    
Posner and Young (2007:130) opine that “by the 1990s, more than 90 percent of presidential elections 
were contested, and by the 2000–2005 periods, this share had risen to 98 percent.” The burgeoning democratic 
culture being touted in the continent seems to be the new way forward for presidents and governments that want 
to be politically legitimate. However, the much cherished legitimacy has been questioned in the face of 
“democracies” that have had their presidents overstaying their welcome in power. Some notable examples of 
such presidents include: Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, in power since 25 October 1997, 
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda since 29 January 1986, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe since 22 December 1987, 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea since August 1979, Paul Biya of Cameroon since November 
1982 and Yahya Jammeh since 1994. These unfolding political events prompt this paper to interrogate factors 
that have contributed to the attrition of democracy in Africa in the last two decades.   
 
4. Democratic Attrition in Africa 1990 -2015: Why the Erosion? 
Different factors have contributed to the erosion of democracy in Africa in the last two decades. One of the 
factors has been the blatant extension or removal of presidential term limit. Certainly the discourse on 
presidential term limit has gained currency in the recent past. Scholars have with gusto delved into the merits and 
demerits of term limit. According to available statistics 17 countries in Africa have amended/replaced or 
disregarded/suspended presidential term limit since 1990. The proponents of term limit have argue that term 
limit enhances electoral turnover, propagates political competition, nurtures democratic culture, prevents 
electoral authoritarianism and guarantees peaceful political transition (Dulani, 2015; Amstrong, 2011; Baker, 
2002, Przeworski et al. 2000; Maltz, 2007 and  Corrales and Penfold, 2014). On the other hand opponents of 
term limit conjecture that term limit deprives society of good leaders and prevents the leaders from finishing 
their “projects” (Baker, 2002). Citing Hume (1752), opponents of term limit contend that term limit deprives 
society of the best possible leaders. Hume assumes that an ideal and progressive government would not institute 
term limit on its chief executive. These reasons have been peddled to remove term limits thus reversing 
democratic gains.  
In Uganda for example, term limit was removed in 2005 to allow Museveni to continue with his “good 
work” of restoring and maintaining peace in Uganda. The removal of term limit in Uganda has allowed 
Museveni to be in power for 30 years. The same argument has been touted to remove or extend term limit in 
Congo Brazzaville and Rwanda. Certainly, the ability of President Paul Kagame to deliver economic benefits for 
his citizens is the greatest argument for allowing him to extend his stay in power for longer. He has been the 
president since 2000 and is serving his second term in office for Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This is not to 
say that all Africa leaders have overstayed their welcome in power, Presidents Joachim Chissano, Amarndo 
Guebuza, Jakaya Kikwete, Goodluck Jonathan, Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba, Festus Mogae have honourably 
relinquished power 
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Democratic overstay in Power 1990- 2015 
 
# Country  Leader  Means of Overstay Year of 
Instituting the 
Overstay 
1. Algeria  Abdelaziz Bouteflika Amendment  2009 
2. Angola  Dos Santos  Disregarded  2007 
3. Burkina Faso Blais Compaore  Amendment  2014 
4. Burundi  Pierre Nkurunziza Disregarded/Court 
interpretation  
2015 
5. Cameroon  Paul Biya  Amendment  2008 
6. Chad  Idriss Deby  Amendment  2006 
7. Congo 
Brazzaville  
Sassou Nguesso’s Amendment  2016 
8. Eritrea  Isaias Afeworki Disregarded  2007 
9. Gabon  Omar Bongo Amendment  2003 
10. Guinea  Lansana Conte  Amendment  2001 
11. Namibia  Sam Nujoma Amendment  2000 
12. Niger  Mamadou Tandja Suspended  2009 
13. Rwanda  
Rwanda  
Juvenal Habyarimana 
Paul Kagame 
Replacement  
Amendment  
1990 
2015 
14. Sudan  Omar Al-Bashir Replacement  2008 
15. Togo Gnassingbe Eyadema Amendment  2002 
16. Tunisia  Ben Ali Amendment  2004 
17. Uganda  Yoweri Musevenu Amendment 20015 2005 
Source: Authors Compilation 2016 
It is imperative at this juncture to distill the political illusion and unfounded innuendos that surround the 
subject of term limit. We argue in this paper that the increasing appetite of African leaders to tinker with the 
constitution to removal term limit has halted the democratic pendulum. The removal of term limits has wrecked 
democratic institutions thus paving way for anarchy. In Burundi for example, Nkurunziza’s push for a third term 
has plunged Burundi into chaos and triggered human right crisis. The root of the crisis lay in the question as to 
the proper interpretation of Article 96 of the Burundi Constitution providing that the “president of the Republic 
is elected by universal direct suffrage for a mandate of five years renewable one time” (Kabumba, 2015). 
Opposition parties argued that the interpretation brought by Nkurunziza contravened the Arusha Accord that 
limited the presidential term to two. The consequence of removal/extension of term limit was the attempted 
coup, which was staged on 13th May 2015 by Godefroid Niyombare. It has also led to unwarranted political 
assassination and civilian deaths and displacement.   According to inter-agency monitoring report 2016, 239,754 
people have been displaced and 439 have been killed. Institutions such as the media have been clamped down.  
In Burkina Faso, the attempts by Blaise Compaore to extend his 27 years stay in power culminated in his 
deposition. The vacuum created by his deposition led to a coup. The extension of Sassou Nguesso’s term through 
a plebiscite led to chaos and the death of 17 people (International Business Times, 2016). The above discussion 
brings us close to the conclusion that democratic gains are being eroded through extension or removal of term 
limit. The extension or removal of term limit is an upfront to the constitution which offers a footstool to the 
democratic culture. The increasing propensity of leaders to remove or extend term limit erodes democratic gains 
and frustrates the consolidation of democracy.     
Related to the issue of presidential term limit are the issues of election and electoral authoritarianism. 
Suffice to say that elections are very critical in championing the tenets of democracy. In other words they 
midwife democracy. In Africa elections have become a periodic ritual held to assuage the electorates or the 
international donors. In fact the debate has morphed from the number or frequency of elections to the quality of 
elections. This prompts us to talk about electoral authoritarianism. Schedler (2006: 1-23) defines electoral 
authoritarianism as a government under the control of a totalitarian leader who purports to establish “the 
institutional facades of democracy including regular multiparty elections for the chief executive in order to 
conceal harsh realities of authoritarian governance.” From Schedler's (2006) postulation we advance the view 
point that the concept speaks to the issue of engrained undemocratic culture of elections manipulation or rather 
election rigging to favour the incumbent. The elections are thus organized in a predetermined pattern designed to 
uphold the status quo. Schedler laconically submits that “electoral contests are subject to state manipulation, so 
severe, widespread and systematic that they do not qualify as democratic.” Goldsmith, (2010) notes that “one 
way to determine the outcome of elections is to intimidate voters and opposition candidates to such an extent that 
competition is reduced sufficiently for the incumbent to stay in power.” Echoing Schedler supposition, Powell 
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(2000) notes the issue with not-so clear democracies is that “they violate the liberal-democratic principles of 
freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule 
rather than instruments of democracy.” In other words they fail the test of democratic rigour.    
In Africa, electoral authoritarianism has continued to manifest.  The continued manifestation of 
electoral authoritarianism has eroded democracy in some countries. According to Wanyande (1998:57) “rather 
than provide the electorate with the opportunity and freedom to choose a government of their choice, the 
government imposes itself on them”. Thus, the electoral system has been used to prevent structural and 
institutional attempts to challenge the primacy of the ruling party government; a factor which undermines the 
democratic condition. In Burundi for instance, electoral authoritarianism was evident in the way the National 
Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) manipulated the 
judiciary and the electoral commission to legitimize the “sad term”. Media houses were closed and majority of 
opposition parties were intimidated into exile. Electoral authoritarianism was manifested by a lack of consensus 
among key stakeholders on pertinent national issues such as election calendar, insecurity, and return of refugees, 
media freedom, civil liberty and composition of the electoral body (see East African Community preliminary 
statement, 2015). This situation led to the boycott of election by a majority of the opposition candidates. Most 
the candidates that we interacted with argued that participating in the election would give Nkurunzinza political 
legitimacy. In Uganda, during the February 2016 general elections the National Resistant Army (NRM) was 
accused of harassing and intimidating opposition parties. The opposition leader, Kizza Besigye was constantly 
under house arrest during the electioneering period. As one respondent noted “You cannot intimidate the main 
opposition candidate and expect people to endorse your win. The political playing field has not been fair to 
warrant credible elections1.”  In its preliminary statement the European Union Election Observation Mission 
wrote:   
The National Resistance Movement’s (NRM’s) domination of the political landscape distorted 
the fairness of the campaign and state actors were instrumental in creating an intimidating 
atmosphere for both voters and candidates. The incumbent had access to funding and means, 
including to public media that were not commensurate with those available to his competitors. 
The lack of transparency and independence of the Electoral Commission (EC), and its 
markedly late delivery of voting material on election day to several districts considered 
opposition strongholds – most notably in Kampala, decreased the opportunity for voters to cast 
their ballots. The Uganda Communication Commission blocked access to social media on 
Election Day which unreasonably constrained freedom of expression and access to 
information. 
Aalen and Tronvoll (2008) report of instances of electoral authoritarianism in Ethiopia during the April 
2008 local elections for neighbourhood and county parliaments. According to them, the ruling party, Ethiopia 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) harassed and overawed    the opposition parties. In summary 
we argue that elections are becoming ritualistic events meant to legitimized otherwise illegitimate regimes thus 
eroding democratic ideals. Electoral authoritarianism is not only limited to elections it has also been exhibited 
during referendums. In the concluded referendum in Congo Brazzaville, the European Union refused to send an 
observer mission arguing that the prevailing legal and institutional framework did not guarantee a free and fair 
referendum. To them, the process was predestined to sanitise Sassou Nguesso’s quest to extend his term in 
office.  
The consequence of electoral authoritarianism leads to another factor that has contributed to the erosion 
of democratic values in Africa - political patronage. Patronage systems chokes democratic requirement for 
transparent institutions. Citing Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Arriola, (2009:1344) posits that patronage system 
destabilise power and create “a system of relations linking rulers not with the ‘public’ or even with the ruled (at 
least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the ‘system.” The 
power dynamic is a result of the complex personal bonds that are founded on mutual material advantage. 
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2004: 165) are more nuanced in their analysis; they contend that “the patron 
furnishes excludable resources to dependents and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation.” These 
parasitic relationships between the ruler and the ruled can be fashioned according to religious or ethnic, clan of 
family cleavages and their impact is usually based on the availability of benefits and how they can be 
apportioned. A patronage network is advantageous to the political elites because it ensures that they have loyal 
people working with them and for them. In most case the patron-client relationship or what Bayat refers to as 
politique du ventre', is sustained by appropriation of state largess much to the chagrin of the indigent population. 
In rare occasions the ties can be advantageous for democratic accountability if the leader’s team is composed of 
technocrats and managers who share the aspirations and policy agenda of the leader and can be trusted to 
implement programmes without sabotage (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2004: 167). 
                                                          
1
 Key informant interview on 20th February 2016 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN (Paper)2224-5766 ISSN (Online)2225-0484 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.16, 2016 
 
74 
Patronage has been destructive to democracy in Africa. It has permeated both political and economic 
spheres thus weakening democratic institutions. Existing literature indicate that patronage systems have been 
used by African leaders to distort economic policies and tinker with constitutions. Due to patronage ties, 
governments in Africa have ended up having bloated cabinets. The bloated cabinet, in most cases, formulated 
around patronage ties ends up consuming a lot of resources meant for development. Kroeger (2012:9) gives an 
example of Cameroon which had 44 ministers in 2000 against its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) converted for 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) that was slightly higher than 23 billion. The resultant effect is poor provision of 
services premised on the fact that a huge chunk of the money is used to run the huge government. Mugabe has 
been accused of sustaining himself in power through patronage. The consequences have been economic 
meltdown of the Zimbabwe economy; violence experienced in 2008 and a stunted democratic agenda in 
Zimbabwe. In Kenya, after the 2007/2008 post-election violence, the largest cabinet was constituted under a 
grand coalition government. It was made up of 40 ministers and 50 assistant ministers. 
The amount of resources used to sustain the huge cabinet was colossal. However, on a positive note it is 
apposite to mention that despite the huge cabinet, the grand coalition was able to initiate a raft of reforms and 
development projects.  Patronage system has also been used to manage elite relations and promote peace in 
ethnically divided societies (Arriola, 2009). In Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny was successful in keeping 
the country stable from 1960-1993 by skillfully utilizing patronage. He distributed key party position and state 
largess to key elites in the system (Vogt 2007:53). Boigny ensured that all important ethnic groups were 
represented in government – in the political party, government, parliament and key state institutions. Vogt (2007) 
in fact considers Boigny “a prototype of a clientelistic one party system”. Implicit in this clientilistic system was 
a carefully ensured ethnic and regional balance.  
Ethnicity has compounded the problem of patronage in Africa. Ethnicity is intertwined with patronage 
system. Since the advent of multiparty politics, ethnicity has continued to ebb the tide of democracy. Ethnic 
competition based on patronage networks has continued to define the nature of political competition and the 
nature of resource distribution. In Ghana for example:  
Successful national elections since 1992 have been marked by the emergence of ethnic bloc 
voting. And patron-client politics works very effectively within the electoral process, as it does 
in so many countries outside Africa, exchanging client votes for patron/leaders for expected 
distribution of material benefits. (Berma, 2010: 26)  
The winner-take-it-all model further exacerbates ethnic competition for state power. Ethnic groups use 
existing democratic institutions to seise power at the expense of small ethnic groups.  This ultimately results to 
corruption and plunder of state resources as ethnic groups maximise on “our turn to eat.” The politics of the belly 
becomes the norm. As recognized by El-Khawas (2001) “the winner-take-all model has presented a serious 
problem that, in the long run, undermines the success of democracy in Africa” because of the resulting instability 
that emanate from entrenched ethnic cleavages. As noted by a respondent, “in Ivory coast and Kenya ethnic 
politics make it hard for opposition parties to be purely opposition parties without their opposition being viewed 
from an ethnic lens1.” In Kenya, political parties and political coalitions have been formed along ethnic lines to 
maximise on “our turn to eat.” Party ideology has been ignored as ethnicity reigns supreme. The consequence of 
“eating” has been unprecedented corruption where public resources are diverted for personal use. The cases of 
corruption reported in Kenya (NYS and youth fund cases) buttresses the above argument. The second 
consequence of ethnic politics is electoral violence. Political exclusion of major ethnic groups raises ethnic 
antipathies that result in ethnically motivated electoral violence.    
That electoral violence has become infused in the political process in Africa since the reintroduction of 
party pluralism. Electoral violence has been used by groups to influence electoral process and to oppose the 
system under which elections have been held. In Africa, it will be right to argue that all the elections with an 
incumbent defending have been violent. The experienced violence can largely be attributed to electoral 
authoritarianism tactics employed by incumbents to remain in power and the fear of defeat and 
disenfranchisement from power. In Kenya, for example, election related violence was experienced in 1992 and 
1997 when President Moi defended his position in office. The violence was mainly experienced in the Rift 
Valley, Coast and Nyanza Regions. In 2007/2008 high voltage violence was experienced when we had the 
incumbent President Kibaki defending his second term. In Côte d’Ivoire in 2010/2011, electoral violence was 
triggered after the incumbent – Laurent Gbagbo refused to relinquish power. In Burundi, violence continues 
unabated due to the failure of Nkurunziza to exit after servicing his two terms in office. Other countries that have 
experienced electoral violence include Nigeria in 2003 and 2007, Lesotho in 1998 and 2007 and Zimbabwe in 
2008. The above examples lead us to conclude that electoral violence recorded in the last two decades have 
eroded democratic gains in Africa.  
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5. Conclusion 
Challenges to democracy abound. As demonstrated in this paper democracy still faces a myriad of challenges. 
It’s also not lost on this paper that significant strides have been made by countries in Africa to institutionalise and 
consolidate democracy. Countries like Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Ghana have made plausible 
progress in the consolidation of their democracy. Therefore, there is need for concerted efforts to ensure that 
democracy takes root in the entire continent. Unrelenting appetite by leaders to tamper with the constitution to 
extend their overstay in power should be abhorred. International, regional, national and local civil society's 
efforts need to go beyond rhetoric to safe guard the sanctity of constitutional provisions. African philosopher 
kings should be encouraged to relinquish power at the expiry of their term. Electoral authoritarianism should be 
rooted out of the electoral process. Elections should a have a meaning to the electorates. They should not be used 
to assuage the egos of chief executives. Elections should be held in a free, fair, transparent and peaceful, 
environment. The outcomes of a credible process should be respected by all the actors in the electoral process. 
The African Union vision of silencing the gun by 2020 should be a reality for democracy to thrive. Silencing the 
gun will weed out the continent of the perennial electoral violence. Genuine democracy should be allowed to 
thrive and take root in Africa. It should be able, as Abraham Lincoln once said to promote “a government of the 
people, by the people and for the people.”    
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